Mercer Law Review
Volume 52
Number 3 Articles Edition - A Symposium:
Ethical Issues in Settlement Negotiations

Article 15

5-2001

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.: A TwentyFour-Hour Safe Harbor for Sexually Explicit Programming
Brandon T. Grinsted

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr

Recommended Citation
Grinsted, Brandon T. (2001) "United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.: A Twenty-Four-Hour Safe
Harbor for Sexually Explicit Programming," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 3 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol52/iss3/15

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote

United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc.: A Twenty-Four-Hour Safe
Harbor for Sexually Explicit Programming

In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the long-standing principal that the government has
a compelling interest to protect minors from exposure to indecent
material. However, the Court held that a federal statute2 restricting
transmission of cable television channels dedicated to sexually explicit
programming violated the First Amendment 3 because the government
failed to prove that the restriction was the least restrictive means of
addressing a real problem.4

1. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
2. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. III 1997).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 120 S. Ct. at 1885, 1893. The relevant portion of the First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend.

I.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1995 Senators Diane Feinstein and Trent Lott offered an amendment to the Telecommunications Act of 1996' in an effort to protect
unsupervised children from exposure to sexually explicit "signal bleed."6
"Signal bleed" is a phenomenon in which audio or visual portions of a
scrambled digital signal might be heard or seen.7 Prior to the amendment, subscribers could request, free of charge, that cable operators fully
scramble or fully block audio and visual signals from unwanted
programs.' However, although cable operators regularly scrambled
certain channels, these techniques did not completely eliminate signal
bleed.' Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted
to curtail the problem of signal bleed associated with sexually oriented
programming. ° Section 505 required cable operators to either fully
scramble, fully block, or limit transmission of sexually oriented
programming to the hours between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m."
In order to comply with Section 505, a majority of cable operators
adopted the "time channeling" approach, which had the effect of
eliminating transmission of sexually explicit programming for two-thirds
of the day.12 Playboy Entertainment Group ("Playboy") owns two adult
networks that provide sexually explicit programming to cable operators3
who subsequently transmit those programs to paying customers. 1

5. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. III
1997).
6. 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709-10 (D. Del. 1998).
7. 120 S. Ct. at 1883.
8. See 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708 n.8; 120 S. Ct. at 1884. Section 504 requires cable
operators to block transmission of a particular channel upon request by a subscribing
customer. 47 U.S.C. § 560 (Supp. III 1997). Subscribers who own modern video cassette
recorders and televisions have the ability to block unwanted channels by programming the
video cassette recorder or television to eliminate reception. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
Furthermore, if the cable operator combines two or more scrambling methods, then signal
bleed will not occur. Id. In addition, converter boxes equipped with "channel mapping"
features can automatically tune to another channel when a viewer attempts to tune into
a scrambled signal. Id. at 708 n.7.
9. 120 S. Ct. at 1883.
10. Id. Section 505 applies exclusively to "sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent." 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp. III 1997).
11. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 706. The particular time in which cable operators were required
to limit the transmission of sexually explicit programs was specifically set by FCC
regulation. Id.
12. 120 S. Ct. at 1883. One government report showed that sixty-eight percent of cable
operators chose to undertake the "time channel" approach to comply with section 505. 30
F. Supp. 2d at 711 n.14.
13. 120 S. Ct. at 1883.
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Although Playboy's signal is initially scrambled, paying customers are
provided a converter box that permits the viewer to see and hear the
programs.14 According to some surveys, thirty to fifty percent of adult
programming occurs prior to 10:00 p.m. If the time channel approach
was adopted, Playboy could face an estimated fifteen percent reduction
in revenues.15
On February 26, 1996, Playboy filed an action in the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit challenging the constitutionality of Section 505 and requesting appointment of a three-judge
district court.' 6 Playboy sought both a declaration that Section 505
violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 7 as well as an injunction against enforcement of the
restriction. Playboy's motion for a temporary restraining order on
enforcement of Section 505 was granted; however, the three-judge panel
denied Playboy's motion for preliminary injunction and lifted the
temporary restraining order."
In March 1998 the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware held a full trial on the
issue."
The district court examined Section 505 and determined that the
statute exclusively regulated signals from sexually explicit programming;
therefore, the court concluded that Section 505 was a content-based
restriction of speech.2 ° As a result, the court concluded that the
government had the burden of proving that the restriction was the least
21
restrictive means in addressing a "compelling" governmental interest.
The court recognized that the government has a compelling interest in
both protecting parental supervision over what their children watch and
in protecting an individual's right to be secure in his or her own home
from unwanted signal bleed.22 However, the court stated that the

14. Id.
15. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711 & n.15.
16. Id. at 705. Playboy's action was consolidated with Graff Pay-Per-View, which is
also an owner of two adult networks; however, Graft subsequently withdrew from litigation.

Id.
17.
18.
19.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
Id. at 706.

20. Id. at 714.
21. Id. at 715. This test is commonly referred to as the "strict scrutiny" test or the
"least restrictive means" test. See PSINET Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625-26
(W.D. Va. 2000); 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 20.10 (2d ed. 1992).
22. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
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government failed to prove the type, duration, and magnitude of the
harm caused from exposure to sexually explicit signal bleed.23
In addition, the court held that the government failed to show that
Section 505 was the least restrictive alternative in light of the existence
of Section 504 of the Telecommunications Act.24 Section 504 allowed
subscribers to request that cable operators block transmission of any
unwanted channels.25 The court found that Section 504 was not only
content neutral, but it also allowed Playboy to broadcast its programming twenty-four hours a day to those subscribers wishing to receive
such material. 26 However, the court concluded that Section 504 would
only be an effective alternative if it was accompanied by public notice
and parental awareness of the available remedies. 27 As a result, the
court required Playboy to ensure that cable operators provide adequate
notice of the blocking devices of Section 504 in its contractual agreements.28 In light of this alternative, the court held that Section 505
was an unconstitutional restriction of speech and enjoined its enforcement.29 The government subsequently filed a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.3 °
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized a legitimate interest
in protecting minors from sexually explicit material; however, restrictions that result in a blanket ban on material suitable for adults have
been subject to a more stringent standard of review. In 1957 the Court
in Butler v. Michigan3' held that a state statute prohibiting the
distribution of material deemed to be harmful to minors was unconstitutional.32 In Butler defendant was charged a one hundred dollar fine for

23. Id. at 716. The government attempted to prove the magnitude of the harm caused
by exposure to sexually explicit programming by the following: (1) an analogy with the
effects of exposure to television violence; (2) drawing an inference that viewing sexually
explicit signal bleed was the same as being exposed to sexually explicit material outright;
(3) expert testimony concerning "dysphoria," modeling and changed attitudes towards
sexuality. Id.

24.

Id. at 718-19.

25. Id. at 718.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 718-19.
28. Id. at 719. The court stated that inserts in monthly bills, on-air advertisements,
mailed notices to those requesting a lockbox, and regular notice conveyed at reasonable
intervals were all viable methods to ensure notice to customers. Id.
29. Id. at 720.
30. 120 S. Ct. at 1885.
31. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
32. Id. at 383-84.
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selling a book containing "lewd or lascivious language" to an undercover
policeman.3 3 Defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that the
statute was an unconstitutional restriction of speech because the statute
prohibited distribution of his book to the general public. 4
Although the Court recognized the State's interest in protecting
minors from indecent material, the Court noted that such an interest did
not justify a blanket ban of material that was suitable for adults.35 The
Court noted that the effect of banning material suitable for adults on the
basis of protecting the welfare of minors would "reduce the adult
population of [the state] to reading only what is fit for children."3" As
a result, the statute was held to be unconstitutional and defendant's
conviction was reversed.37
Eleven years after Butler, the Court in Ginsberg v. New York3"
upheld a state prohibition on the sale of magazines depicting female
nudity to persons under the age of seventeen.39 After being convicted
of selling two adult magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy, defendant
appealed contending that the statute unconstitutionally restricted speech
because the statute sought to deny minors the right to access the same
material that individuals over seventeen could read and see.'0 Confronting the issue of whether the State could restrict a minor's right to
access sex material more heavily than an adult's right to access the
same type of material, the Court noted that the State has an exigent
interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens by preventing the
distribution of objectionable material to minors." Noting the distinct
effect of erotic expression on children, the Court recognized the State's
supervening interest in controlling the conduct of children. 2

33. Id. at 381-82.
34. Id. In addition, defendant contended that the statute was unconstitutional because
it banned distribution of his publication on the basis of isolated passages that appeared
offensive only when separated from the book as a whole. Furthermore, defendant contended
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. However, the Court did not take such a
"wide sweep" and avoided deciding the matter on these bases. Id. at 381-82.
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id. The Court stated that restricting the general reading public to material fit for
minors was "to burn the house to roast the pig." Id.
37. Id. at 384.
38. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
39. Id. at 637, 645.
40. Id. at 631, 636.
41. Id. at 636-38.
42. Id. at 639 n.6. The Court noted that immaturity and "other considerations" may
justify applying different standards in analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on the
distribution of material to minors. Id.
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Specifically, the Court noted that two primary interests justified the
State's restriction of access to adult material by minors when it is
rational for the legislature to find that such exposure might be
harmful.43 First, the Court recognized that the State has an interest
in adopting legislation designed to aid parents in the care, custody, and
nurture of their children." Second, the Court noted that the State has
an interest in protecting the welfare of its children.45 In light of these
legitimate interests and the fact that the statute did not seek to impose
an outright ban on all material distributed to adults as well as minors,
the Court held that the statute was a reasonable restriction on
speech.4"
The Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.4 struck down a
similar attempt to justify an outright ban on commercial speech. In
Bolger, Youngs Drug Products Corp. ("Youngs"), a manufacturer and
distributor of contraceptives, was notified by the postal service that its
practice of unsolicited mass mailings of materials pertaining to
prophylactics and contraceptives was prohibited by federal law. Youngs
brought an action against the postal service alleging that the ban on
mailings was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 4 The Court
recognized that the statute sought to protect parents' interest in
protecting their children from unsolicited material; however, the Court
stated that an outright ban on unsolicited mailings containing material
suitable for adults was unconstitutionally broad.49 In reaching this
decision, the Court noted that parents already have adequate control
over and sufficient protections from the dissemination of unwanted
material from their mailboxes.5 °
The interest of parents in controlling the information disseminated to
their children as well as the intrusive nature of the particular medium
of communication have both been considered by the Court in analyzing
the constitutionality of restrictions on speech disseminated through

43. Id. at 639-40.
44. Id. at 639.
45. Id. at 640.
46. Id. at 634-35, 641-43.
47. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
48. Id. at 63-64. The materials distributed by mass unsolicited mailing consisted of
three types of publication: (1) flyers promoting the distributor's products including
prophylactics; (2) flyers exclusively devoted to prophylactics; (3) informational pamphlets
discussing the desirability and availability of condoms as well as the use of condoms in
preventing venereal diseases and providing descriptions of condoms manufactured by the
distributor. Id. at 63 n.4.
49. Id. at 73-74.
50. Id. at 73.
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5 2 the Supreme
broadcast media."' In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
Court considered both the parental interests set out in Ginsberg as well
as the preventive measures available to the recipient of speech in
upholding an order seeking to prohibit the radio transmission of a
monologue containing indecent language.53
In considering whether the First Amendment denies the government
power to restrict public broadcast of indecent language, the Court noted
that the broadcast media is accorded less protection than other mediums
of expression. 4 The Court noted that the intrusive nature of radio
transmission is readily apparent in determining the constitutionality of
restrictions because the listener does not receive warning prior to
receiving unexpected transmissions; therefore, the individual's right to
privacy may be infringed.55 In addition, the Court declared that
broadcasting is especially accessible to children and that the parents'
right to control what their children hear justifies treating broadcasting
differently than other forms of communication.56 Finally, the Court
noted that, unlike the restriction in Butler, the FCC's proposed
restriction did not amount to a complete ban on the subject material.57
As a result, the Court held that the Commission's action was constitutional.5 8
Although the Court in Pacificarelied heavily on the pervasive nature
of the broadcast medium in reaching its conclusion that the regulation
of speech was constitutional, the Court has struck down similar

51. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
52. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
53. Id. at 748-50. The monologue was entitled "Filthy Words" and was given by
humorist George Carlin in front of a live audience. The monologue was twelve minutes
long and consisted of a variety of expletives. Id. at 729, 751-55. After a man complained
to the FCC that he had unintentionally received the broadcast while driving with his young
son at about 2:00 p.m., the FCC issued an order declaring that the broadcast was "patently
offensive" and sought to limit the transmission of the monologue to times when children
were unlikely to hear it. Id. at 729-33.
54. Id. at 748. The Court declared that "each medium of expression presents special
First Amendment problems. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has
received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 748-49.
56. Id. at 749-50.
57. Id. at 750 n.28. The FCC did not impose immediate sanctions against Pacifica;
however, it did state that if subsequent complaints were received, sanctions would be
imposed. Id. at 730. After issuing the order, the FCC determined that the monologue was
"patently offensive" and issued an opinion stating that the "time channeling" approach was
intended to be utilized to prevent children from hearing such material. Id. at 732-33.
58. Id. at 750-51. The Court noted that the relevant factors considered were the time
of the day when the transmission was broadcast, the content of the program, and the
pervasiveness of the medium involved. Id. at 750.
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restrictions in which less restrictive means are available to protect
minors from exposure to indecent material.5" In Sable Communications
of California, Inc. v.FCC,6" the Court held that a complete ban on
indecent telephone messages violated the First Amendment."' In Sable,
Sable Communications of California, Inc. ("Sable"), a communications
company, offered prerecorded sexually oriented phone messages to
callers for a special fee.62 Section 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934" imposed a blanket prohibition against all indecent and obscene
interstate telephone messages. 4 As a result, Sable filed an action
against the FCC seeking a declaration that section 223(b) was an
unconstitutional restriction on speech and sought an injunction against
the statute's enforcement.6 5
In determining whether the statute's ban on indecent messages was
constitutional, the Court followed Ginsberg and recognized that there is
a compelling governmental interest in protecting the well-being of
minors; however, the Court stated that the government could only
regulate constitutionally protected speech if the restriction was the least
intrusive means to achieve that interest.66 The Court distinguished
Pacifica by noting both the presence of a complete ban rather than a
"time channeling" restriction and the fact that telephone callers were not
a "captive audience" as were listeners to radio broadcasts.6 7 The Court
declared that the telephone medium required listeners to take active
steps to receive the desired communication; therefore, telephone callers

59. Id. at 748-49; see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989).
60. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
61. Id. at 127-28.
62. Id. at 118-19.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1994). This section was added to the Communications Act of
1934 in order to specifically address "dial-a-porn," which was not covered in the original
statute. 492 U.S. at 120. The original section sought to restrict access to sexually explicit
messages by minors and did not criminalize providing obscene or indecent messages to
adults. Id. at 120-21. However, the amended version instituted a complete ban, making
it illegal to provide indecent or obscene messages to anyone. This amended version was
at issue in Sable. Id. at 122-23.
64. 492 U.S. at 122. Callers outside the area in which Sable was operating could call
long distance and access the messages; therefore, Sable's activities constituted interstate
commercial activity that was regulated by the statute. Id. at 118.
65. Id. at 118.
66. Id. at 126. The Court also considered another provision that imposed an outright
ban on obscene telephone messages and determined that the provision was constitutional
because the First Amendment's protection did not extend to obscene material. Id. at 124.
67. Id. at 127.
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were not susceptible to unexpected outbursts of reception as were radio
listeners or recipients of unsolicited mailings. 8
The Court concluded that the ban on indecent messages was unconstitutional because the total ban was excessive in light of the existing
alternatives. 9 Although the FCC claimed that section 223(b) was
enacted because Congress believed that nothing short of a complete ban
would be effective, the Court declared that there was nothing in the
legislative record that suggested the absence of viable alternatives.70
The Court noted that scrambling, access codes, and credit card rules
were viable alternatives and would not restrict speech to the extent of
a complete ban; as a result, the Court concluded the ban was unconstitutional71as it reflected another attempt to "'burn[] the house to roast the
pig.'"
Similarly, in Reno v. ACLU2 the Supreme Court recognized the
interest in protecting the well-being of children as compelling; however,
the Court held that a prohibition on the knowing transmission of
obscene communications over the internet was unconstitutional in light
of both the existing alternatives available and the noninvasive nature of
the medium.73 In Reno plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 74 which sought to

68. Id. at 127-28.
69. Id. at 131. These alternatives consisted of credit card access, access codes, and
message scrambling. Id. at 121-22. The credit card access system would restrict messages
to those individuals who provided a valid credit card number. The access codes would
restrict messages to only those individuals who had an authorized identification code,
which would only be provided to those eighteen or older. Id. Message scrambling would
only allow those individuals who had a descrambler to hear messages. The sale of the
descramblers would be restricted to adults. Id. at 122.
70. Id. at 130-31.
71. Id. at 131 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
72. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
73. Id. at 868-79. The Court noted that existing systems allowed parents to control
what their children were exposed to on the internet. Id. at 854-55. The Court found that
these systems could either limit access to a pre-approved list of sources or block
inappropriate messages or objectionable sites. Id. at 855.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a),(d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Section 223(a) prohibits the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent material, by a telecommunications device, to a person
under eighteen years of age and subjects violators to imprisonment, fine, or both. Id.
§ 223(a). Section 223(d) prohibits knowingly displaying or sending "patently offensive"
material to a child under eighteen years of age through the use of an interactive computer.
Id. § 223(d).
Initially twenty plaintiffs filed an action against the Attorney General and the Justice
Department; however, a second action was filed and twenty-seven additional plaintiffs
joined. The separate actions were subsequently consolidated into a single suit. 521 U.S.
at 861-62 nn.27-28.
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prohibit the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent material over
the internet to children.75
Noting that the "invasive" nature of the medium may justify a
governmental regulation, the Court found that messages or images over
the internet require some affirmative action on the part of the recipient
and the risk that objectionable material would appear accidentally were
slim; therefore, the Court found the internet to be less invasive than the
radio medium involved in Pacifica.7" Although the Court followed
Ginsberg and recognized a compelling interest in protecting the wellbeing of minors, the Court held that the restriction was overbroad and
posed a significant burden on internet communication between adults."
In light of the burdens the restriction would place on internet communications and the absence of evidence showing that the existing safeguards
were ineffective, the Court held that the restriction was not the least
restrictive means to accomplish its compelling interest." As a result,
the provisions were held to be invalid.7 9
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, ° the Court examined the constitutionality of a federal statute"'
that sought to regulate sexually explicit programming provided on public
and leased television channels.82 The Court followed Sable and found

75. 521 U.S. at 861.
76. Id. at 861, 868-70. The Court stated that the "history of extensive Government
regulation of the broadcast medium; the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception;
and its 'invasive' nature" all may justify a regulation of a particular broadcast medium.
Id. at 868 (citations omitted). The Court noted that most sexually explicit images were
preceded by a warning prior to appearance on a computer screen. Id. at 869. The Court
also stated that Pacificacould be distinguished because the radio medium creates the risk
that the listener may be "'taken by surprise by an indecent message.'" Id. at 870 (quoting
Sable, 492 U.S. at 128).
77. Id. at 877-78. The Court noted that it agreed that "'there is a compelling interest
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors' which extended to
shielding them from indecent messages that are not obscene by adult standards." Id. at
869 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
The Court stated that requiring senders of internet messages to know the age of their
recipients, in the absence of an effective age-verification system, "would surely burden
communication among adults." Id. at 876. The Court further held that the restriction was
"wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica,the scope
of [the restriction] is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities." Id. at 877.
78. Id. at 879.
79. Id. at 885.
80. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
82. 518 U.S. at 732-33. The Court distinguished leased channels from public channels
by noting that leased channels were those channels that federal law required operators to
reserve for commercial lease, whereas public channels were those channels that local
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that the governmental interest in protecting children from "patently
offensive sex-related material" was indeed compelling and that the
pervasiveness of television broadcasts was similar to the radio broadcast
3 However, the Court held that a provision that required
in Pacifica."
operators to place sexually explicit programming on a separate channel
and then to block that channel until a subscriber requested access to the
programming was an unconstitutional restriction of speech.'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that although there was a
compelling interest in protecting children from sexually explicit
programming, the "segregate and block" requirements were too
restrictive in light of existing statutory requirements such as scrambling
and requested blocking. 5 In the absence of evidence that these
alternatives were ineffective and that the segregate and block restriction

governments required to be set aside for public education or governmental purposes. Id.
at 734.
The statute contained three provisions. Section 10(a) applied to leased channels and
permitted cable operators to decide whether to broadcast sexually explicit programming.
Id. at 737. Section 10(b) also applied to leased channels and required cable operators to
place sexually explicit programming on a separate channel, to block that channel, then to
unblock the channel within thirty days after a customer sent in a written request for access
to the channel. Id. at 753-54. Section 10(c) was similar to 10(a) in that it permitted cable
operators to decide whether to prohibit broadcast of sexually explicit programs; however,
10(c) applied to public rather than leased channels. Id. at 760.
83. Id. at 743-44. The Court stated that "[clable television broadcasting ... is as
'accessible to children' as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so." Id. at 744 (quoting
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749).
84. Id. at 760. The Court also considered the constitutionality of a provision that
permitted cable operators to decide on their own whether to broadcast sexually explicit
programming and determined that such a provision was constitutional because it was
inherently different than a complete ban. Id. at 746-47. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court found that the provision "restrict[ed] speech less than, not more than, the ban at
issue in Pacifica." Id. at 745. Furthermore, the Court held that the restriction could be
distinguished from Sable because the medium at issue in Sable (telephone) was
.significantly less likely to expose children to the banned material, was less intrusive [than
television], and allowed for significantly more control over what comes into the home than
either broadcasting or [] cable transmission." Id. at 748.
85. Id. at 759-60. The Court noted that current law already required cable operators
to scramble or block sexually explicit programming on unleased channels dedicated to such
material. Id. at 756 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C. § 561). In
addition, the Court noted that cable operators were already required to honor a subscriber's
request to block such channels. Id. (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47
U.S.C. § 560). Furthermore, the Court noted that "V-Chip" technology will be required to
be placed on televisions and will automatically block sexually explicit or otherwise offensive
programming. Id.
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was necessary to protect children from sexually explicit material, the
Court held the restriction was unconstitutional. 6
Finally, the Court held that a separate provision permitting a cable
operator to prohibit sexually explicit programming on public access
channels was unconstitutional because there was insufficient evidence
indicating that there was a widespread problem of children becoming
exposed to sexually explicit programs on public access channels. 87 In
light of existing control systems associated with public broadcasting, the
Court concluded that the provision was too restrictive and therefore
constituted an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 8
Because of the Court's decision in Denver, cable operators were free to
decide whether and when to transmit adult programming to subscribers. 9 However, the scrambling technology utilized by operators to
prevent transmission of adult programs was not perfect.9" In Playboy
the Court confronted the risk posed to children as a result of these
technological problems and again found itself defending the First
Amendment.9
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In a five to four opinion, the Court in Playboy held that a federal
statute requiring cable operators to either fully scramble, fully block, or
restrict transmission of sexually explicit programming to certain times
of the day was an unconstitutional restriction of speech. 2 Although the
majority found the restriction to be a burden on speech rather than an

86. Id. at 756-60. The Court also refused to concede that the practical difficulties
associated with devices that permitted parents to block out offensive programming
(lockboxes) justified the segregate and block restriction. Id. at 758-59.
87. Id. at 760, 766. The Court declared that "[t]he Commission itself did not report any
examples of 'indecent' programs on public access channels." Id. at 764 (emphasis in

original).
88. Id. at 761-66. The Court noted that the public broadcasting system is subject to
local, public, private, and nonprofit organizations that are "capable of addressing the
problem, should it arise, of patently offensive programming broadcast to children, making

it unlikely that many children will in fact be exposed to programming considered patently
offensive in that community." Id. at 762-63. In addition, the Court noted that there were
existing control mechanisms within the public broadcast system that could "avoid,
minimize, or eliminate any child-related
programming." Id. at 763-64.
89. See id. at 733.
90. 120 S. Ct. at 1883.
91. Id. at 1882-83.
92. Id. at 1882, 1893.

problems concerning 'patently offensive'
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93
outright ban, the Court refused to adopt a lower standard of scrutiny.
The majority conceded that the government has an interest in protecting
minors from harmful exposure to sexually explicit material; however, the
Court held that this interest was not sufficient to justify a content-based
restriction in light of the available alternatives.9 4
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Court and was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg."6 Kennedy first
identified the statute as a content-based restriction on speech because
the statute was only applied "to channels primarily dedicated to
'sexually explicit adult programming ...that is indecent'" and was not
concerned with other channels.9 " In addition, the Court noted that the
statute would have the practical effect of eliminating transmission of
adult programming during times of the day when a significant percentage of such programming was viewed.97 Therefore, the Court declared
that "ilt is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete
prohibition" and imposed the "same rigorous scrutiny" as applied to a
complete ban." As a significant content-based restriction on speech,
the majority declared that the government had the burden of proving
that the restriction is the least restrictive means to serve a compelling
governmental interest in light of the existing alternatives.9 9
The majority first attacked the government's contention that the
problem of signal bleed was of such magnitude to justify the restriction
of Section 505.10 The Court stated that there was no proof as to the
likelihood that a minor would be subject to signal bleed nor any evidence
establishing the duration or quality of such transmissions.' Although

93. Id. at 1885-86. The Court stated that "[tihe distinction between laws burdening

and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's content-based
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans." Id. at 1886.

94. Id. at 1885-87.
95. Id. at 1882.
96. Id. at 1885 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561). The Court noted that "[t]he statute is
unconcerned with signal bleed from any other channels." Id.
97. Id. at 1886. In reaching this conclusion, the majority noted "that the only
reasonable way for a substantial number of cable operators to comply with the letter of
Section 505 is to time channel, which silences the protected speech for two-thirds of the
day" and relied upon the district court's finding that "'30 to 50% of all adult programming

is viewed by households prior to 10 p.m.,' when the safe-harbor period begins." Id. (quoting
30 F. Supp. 2d at 711).

98.
99.
answer
100.

Id.
Id. at 1886. The Court stated, "[a]s we consider a content-based regulation, the
should be clear: The standard is strict scrutiny." Id.
Id. at 1889.

101. Id. The Court stated that "[tihe First Amendment requires a more careful

assessment and characterization of an evil in order to justify a regulation as sweeping as
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the government presented evidence of isolated incidents of exposure and
provided an estimate of the potential of such exposure, the majority
declared that such evidence was insufficient to accurately quantify the
actual extent of the problem. 1 2 As a result, the majority held that the
government had not proven the existence of a significant widespread
problem justifying the restrictions of Section 505.103
While investigating the alternatives available to regulate the problem
of exposure of minors to sexually explicit material, the majority noted
that the cable broadcasting system is a unique broadcast medium that
has the capacity to block objectionable material on a house-by-house
basis."°
The majority emphasized that "targeted blocking is less
restrictive than banning" and that the present restriction could not
stand if these methods were viable alternatives.' ° The majority then
declared that the government had not proven that the less restrictive
alternative of Section 504 was inadequate to address the problem of
signal bleed."°
Under Section 504, cable operators are required to block particular
0 ' Although
programming upon request by the subscriber."
the government contended that Section 504 would be ineffective to prevent signal

this." Id.
102. Id. at 1890-91. At trial, the government presented evidence of complaints made
by city officials, two city councillors, and one senator to their respective cable operator,
congressman, and to the FCC about signal bleed. In addition, there was evidence of a
particular incident involving a child who was staying over at a friend's house and was
exposed to signal bleed. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709. The government presented expert
testimony showing that 39 million homes with 29.5 million children were potentially
exposed to signal bleed. This evidence was based upon the Advertising Bureau's estimates
and Census figures. In addition, the expert estimated that, based on the number of
subscribers to two adult channels (Spice and Playboy), there were an estimated 38.65
million homes with the potential to become exposed to signal bleed from sexually explicit
programming. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09 n.9.
103. 120 S. Ct. at 1890-91. The majority stated that the "Government made no attempt
to confirm the accuracy of its estimate through surveys or other field tests... [w]ithout
some sort of field survey, it is impossible to know how widespread the problem in fact is."
Id. at 1890-91.
104. Id. at 1887.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1892. Although the Court found that the Government failed to establish
that a publicized Section 504 would be ineffective, the majority declared that the district
court should not have attempted to implement the notice requirements by judicial decree.
The majority stated that "[t]he appropriate remedy was not to repair the statute, it was
to enjoin the speech restriction." Id. at 1891-92.
107. Section 504 requires cable operators to block any undesired channel when the
subscribing customer makes such a request. 47 U.S.C. § 560. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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bleed in cases in which parents were indifferent, the majority declared
that there was nothing in the evidence showing that Section 504 would
be ineffective if parents were adequately notified of their right to request
blocking."0 8 Furthermore, the majority noted that a publicized Section
504 would provide parents with the information they needed to make
well-informed decisions and would allow parents to block unwanted
programming even after 10:00 p.m.'0 9 The Court concluded that
Section 505 could not offer this type of assistance to cable customers."0
Finally, the Court noted, although a publicized Section 504 could not
totally eliminate the problem of signal bleed, children would also be
exposed to signal bleed under Section 505.111 The majority stated that
"it is hardly unknown for [children]
to be unsupervised in front of the
2
television set after 10 p.m.""
The majority concluded that the government failed to sufficiently
prove a problem of such magnitude to justify the restriction on daytime
programming and that the government failed to show that existing less
restrictive alternatives were inadequate.'
As a result, the majority
held that the "Government has failed to show that § 505 is the least
restrictive means for addressing a real problem" and that Section 505
was an unconstitutional
content-based restriction on speech under the
114
First Amendment.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justice Scalia, dissented, contending that the evidence was sufficient
to prove the seriousness of the problem of signal bleed and that Section
504 was not an effective alternative." 5 The dissent first stated that

108.

120 S. Ct. at 1892-93. The government also contended that the possibility that

requested blocking devices might fail, the time it takes to respond to such requests, and
the possibility that cable operators may switch channels would render Section 504
ineffective. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 713, 718-19. Furthermore, the government presented
evidence that the cost of distributing a large number of blocking devices would not be
economically feasible for operators because the cost would eventually exceed the operator's
profits thereby creating the risk that programming would be canceled. Id. at 713. The
Court responded that this argument was based on the mere "assumption that a sufficient
percentage of households, informed of the potential for signal bleed, would consider it

enough of a problem to order blocking devices-an assumption for which there is no
support." 120 S. Ct. at 1892.

109. Id. at 1893.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1892-93.
112.

Id. at 1893.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1885, 1893.
115. Id. at 1898 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although agreeing with the principal dissent,
Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 120 S. Ct. at 1895 (Scalia, J.,
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Section 505 was enacted not to just "control incomplete scrambling" but
was also concerned with eliminating the problems of insufficient
scrambling techniques utilized by cable operators through the implementation of uniform statutory requirements. 6 In addition, the dissent
emphasized that Section 505 was not a total ban on speech, but rather
represented a burden on the selected speech that was proper in the
pursuit of a legislative effort to protect children." 7 Finally, the dissent
noted that the statute was not overbroad because it applied only to
channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit programming."18
Thus, the dissent contended that this case "does not present the kind of
narrow tailoring concerns seen in other cases."" 9
The dissent emphatically disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the government failed to prove the seriousness of the signal bleed
problem. 2 °
The dissent noted that the government's statistical
evidence concerning the number of households with children combined
with the fact that seventy-five percent of scrambling systems were
inadequate illustrated that twenty-nine million children in homes were
at risk of exposure to signal bleed.' 2' Furthermore, the dissent noted
that the anecdotal evidence provided by the government's expert
witnesses as well as the complaints made by the public officials were
probative of a more widespread and serious problem.'2 2
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Section
504 was an effective alternative to Section 505.123 According to the

dissenting). Justice Scalia contended that Playboy was advertising its nonobscene material
in a "patently offensive" manner and that such commercial behavior is not protected under
the First Amendment. Id. at 1896. According to Justice Scalia, "[s]ection 505 regulates
just this sort of business." Id.
In reaching his conclusion that Section 505 was
constitutional, Justice Scalia stated that "[slince the Government is entirely free to block
these transmissions, it may certainly take the less drastic step of dictating how, and during
what times, they may occur." Id. at 1898.
116. 120 S. Ct. at 1898-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1899. The dissent stated that "the majority's characterization of this
statutory scheme as 'prohibit[ing]... speech' is an exaggeration." Id. at 1899. The dissent
declared that the statute would make adult programming less profitable; however, "[1]aws
that burden speech ... may create serious First Amendment issues, but they are not the
equivalent of an absolute ban on speech itself." Id.
118. Id. at 1900.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The dissent also claimed that if the majority was correct in concluding that
the problem of signal bleed was not serious, then the statute would not impose a significant
burden on cable operators to attempt to remedy the problem. Id.
123. Id. at 1900-02.
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dissent, the two sections served different goals.'24 The dissent contended that Section 504 gives parents the right to take affirmative steps
to request a particular channel to be blocked and that Section 505 was
inherently different in that it blocks transmission of adult channels to
children whose parents were unaware of their rights under Section 504
or were unable to supervise their children's viewing habits at critical
times. 2 ' Therefore, the dissent argued that Section 505 was intended
to operate in the absence of parental supervision and was similar to laws
that deny a minor's access to "adult cabarets or X-rated movies." 2 ' The
dissent emphasized that the government has a compelling interest in
protecting minors from access to sexually explicit material in the absence
of adult supervision and emphatically attacked any implication that such
an interest was anything less than compelling.'2 7
In addition, the dissent argued that a publicized Section 504 would not
be an effective alternative to Section 505.128 According to the dissent,
advertising Section 504 could not aid parents in discovering their
children's viewing habits, nor could it resolve the practical difficulties
associated with the amount of time it took to set up a blocking device
and the problems associated with faulty installations. 129 Furthermore,
the dissent contended Playboy's programming could be totally eliminated
if more than a minimal amount of subscribers requested blocking
devices. 3 ° Finally, the dissent argued that the "remote possibility"
that a publicized Section 504 might achieve the government's objective
could not support the conclusion that Section 504 was as effective as
Section 505.131 According to the dissent, the government was entitled
to "a degree of leeway ... when it chooses among possible alternatives
in light of predicted comparative effects.' ' 132 The dissent declared that

124. Id. at 1901.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1901-02.
128. Id. at 1902.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1903. The dissent stated that if more than six percent of Playboy's viewers
exercised their rights under Section 504, then Playboy's costs would rise "to the point that
Playboy would be forced off the air entirely, a consequence that would not seem to further
anyone's interest in free speech." Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1901. The dissent claimed that "a 'less restrictive alternative' must be 'at
least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.'" Id. (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 874). The dissent also declared that "[tihese words
imply a degree of leeway, however small, for the legislature when it chooses among possible
alternatives in light of predicted comparative effects." Id.
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to allow the Court to imagine or create possible33 alternatives would

enable the Court to nullify duly enacted statutes.
The dissent noted that the Court had historically upheld restrictions
on speech when a compelling interest was at stake and when the "First
Amendment poses a barrier that properly is high, but not insurmountable." 134 The dissent emphasized that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children from a serious problem, and the
government had proven that Section 504 was ineffective in resolving
that problem.'85 Noting that Section 505 imposed a burden upon
speech rather than a complete ban, the dissent declared that Section 505
"restricts speech no more than necessary to further that compelling
need." '36 As a result, the dissent concluded that Section 505 was a
constitutional restriction on speech."3 7
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court has consistently recognized a compelling interest in
protecting minors from exposure to sexually explicit material; however,
the Court has not formulated an ironclad rule to determine whether
parents or the government should bear the responsibility of protecting
children from exposure to such material. Recognizing the importance of
freedom of speech in ordered society, the Court has adopted a standard
of scrutinizing content-based restrictions on speech that requires the
government to show the existence of a widespread problem that justifies
a particular restriction. In addition, the Court has consistently required
the government to show such restrictions on speech are the least
Although the Court's
intrusive in light of existing alternatives.
adherence to such a heightened degree of scrutiny is not intended to
completely eliminate governmental restriction of indecent material,
Playboy makes it clear that the government will face three primary
obstacles that may make it practically impossible to justify governmental
regulation of society's new communications media.
First, Playboy places such a heavy evidentiary burden on the
government in proving the existence and magnitude of a problem that
any attempt by the government to justify a restriction on the dissemination of sexually explicit material will more than likely fail. Playboy

133. Id. The dissent attacked the majority's conclusion in "finding 'adequate
alternatives' where there are none" as "reduc[ing] Congress' protective power to the
vanishing point." Id. at 1904.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1903.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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makes it clear that anecdotal, statistical estimates, and evidence of
isolated incidents of exposure are not sufficient to prove the existence of
a problem that will justify governmental regulation of speech.138
However, given the fact that many minors are at home unsupervised
while watching television or accessing the internet, such evidence of
exposure may never be accurately ascertained. If children are unsupervised during a portion of the daytime hours, then the actual extent of
exposure may never be known unless the minor personally files a
complaint or a parent discovers the indecent material being transmitted;
as a result, an accurate survey of the actual magnitude of the problem
may never materialize.
Second, Playboy requires the government to prove the actual extent of
harm to children from exposure to indecent material; however, the
detrimental effects of exposure may not be accurately ascertained until
a child becomes a young adult.' 3 Although at least one court has
responded to this potential problem, Playboy does not provide courts
with any ascertainable standard to determine what degree of evidence
is required to show a causal connection between a minor's exposure to
indecent or graphical material and psychological harm. 140

It still

remains to be seen whether courts will respond to Playboy by requiring
the government to show evidence of more definitive scientific research
when addressing the element of causation; however, by requiring the
government to show more than anecdotal evidence, Playboy creates a
potentially "insurmountable obstacle" when the legislature seeks to
address a problem that has unknown psychological ramifications.
Third, Playboy allows courts to look not only at the existing lessrestrictive alternatives that may be available, but it also allows courts
to invalidate legislation if there is the mere possibility of viable
alternatives. With the advent of modern technology, the possibility of
potentially viable alternatives is limitless and courts will have broad
discretion to determine what will be possible in the near future.
Because the limits of modern technology are vague at best, courts will
have the power to invalidate a proposed restriction on indecent material
according to their own notions of what is possible and how existing
regulations may be improved. Allowing the courts to look at the possible

138. See supra note 104.
139. See supra note 104.
140. See American Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, No. 00-3643, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4371, at *19-22 (7th Cir. March 23, 2001) (holding that a city ordinance limiting
access of minors to violent video games could not be justified on the basis of a study that
lacked a finding that graphical video games have caused an individual to commit a crime
or have caused an increase in violence).
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alternatives rather than existing alternatives will authorize judges to
invalidate prohibitions on speech based on alternatives that may not be
economically or practically feasible under the circumstances. Although
Playboy makes it clear that courts are not free to "repair" existing
statutes, the limitations on the judicial power to scrutinize legislation in
light of what may someday be possible is not entirely clear.'
Finally, Playboy emphasizes that any restriction that substantially
burdens speech will be subject to the same scrutiny as a complete ban
Under this approach, any entity dissemion the subject material.'
nating sexually explicit material may prove that a restriction is
unconstitutional simply because it is no longer profitable to engage in
such an enterprise although the restriction does not seek to completely
prohibit such speech. By refusing to draw a distinction between laws
burdening speech from laws banning speech, the Court acknowledges the
fact that a significant restriction may practically result in a ban on an
entity's ability to disseminate its material; however, the Court does not
clearly ascertain what degree of restriction will amount to a ban.
Because the Court does not provide guidance as to what constitutes a
"significant" burden, lawyers will continue to argue that the economic
ramifications of a regulation justify holding that legislation unconstitutional. If the Court distinguished burdens from bans, legislation seeking
to restrict communication rather than to ban such outright speech would
not be subject to such litigation and dispute.
Modern technology has provided society with fast, efficient, and
effective communication systems that allow individuals to interact with
each other regardless of geographical or cultural boundaries. The
accessability of the internet and cable television increases the risk of
exposure to potentially harmful material by children, and Playboy has
created a standard of scrutiny that may prove to be insurmountable for
the government in seeking to control those risks. In a world of high-tech
gadgets and digital communication, sexually explicit programming has
been given a safe harbor with impenetrable boundaries.
BRANDON

141.
142.

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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